Statute of limitations for online defamation: compared

The statute of limitations for online defamation is short in every place we could read. It is one year in England and Wales under the Limitation Act 1980, in Ireland, in New South Wales and in New York, and two years in Florida and, for money claims, New Zealand. In most of those places the clock runs from the first time the post could be seen, not from the day you found it, and a late claim needs a court's permission that is never automatic.

A defamation claim can be strong on the facts and still fail because the year ran out while the person was writing to the platform or waiting for a lawyer to be free. If a post about you is false and you may want to sue, treat the period as short and speak to a lawyer promptly.

This guide compares the clocks only: how long each place gives you, when the count starts, what a repost does and how a late claim is rescued. It is information, not legal advice. Every period below comes from a statute or court page we opened for this guide, with the section number, and one section lists the places we could not read.

The short version

One year is the usual limit in the texts we read: Limitation Act 1980 section 4A, Defamation Act 2009 section 38, New South Wales Limitation Act 1969 section 14B and New York CPLR 215(3). Florida allows two years, and so does New Zealand for money claims.
Count from the first upload or first publication, not from discovery. Ireland and New South Wales say so in their text, and the England and Wales rule folds repeats back to the first publication.
A repost of the same words usually does not restart the clock. A materially different new publication can.
A court can extend the time in England and Wales, Ireland and New South Wales, and New Zealand has a late knowledge route, but only on its own judgment and never as of right. Plan as if it will not.
We could not read Scotland, Northern Ireland, Canada, California, Texas or most other states. Check those with a local lawyer today.

One yearthe ordinary limit for libel or slander in England and Wales (Limitation Act 1980), Ireland, New South Wales and New York

Two yearsthe limit in Florida for libel or slander, and in New Zealand for money claims in defamation

Three yearsthe outer limit a New South Wales court may extend to, counted from publication

Sources: Limitation Act 1980 section 4A; Defamation Act 2009 section 38; New South Wales Limitation Act 1969 sections 14B and 56A; New York CPLR 215(3); Florida Statutes 95.11(5)(h); Nottingham v Maltese Cat [2019] NZCA 641 on section 15 of the New Zealand Limitation Act 2010.

One year in most places, two in a few: the clocks side by side

The ordinary clock is one year in four of the six jurisdictions we read and two years in the other two. The table puts each place on the same four criteria, so you can see in one glance which clock is shortest, what starts it and what the late route looks like.

Place and source	Ordinary clock	What starts it	Late claim route
England and Wales, Limitation Act 1980 s4A	One year	Date the cause of action accrued; repeats counted from first publication under Defamation Act 2013 s8	Court discretion if equitable, s32A
Ireland, Defamation Act 2009 s38	One year	First publication; online, the date first capable of being viewed	Court may allow up to two years from accrual
New South Wales, Limitation Act 1969 s14B	One year	Date of publication; electronic matter, the day first uploaded or sent	Court may extend up to three years, s56A
New York, CPLR 215(3)	One year	First posting, per the Court of Appeals in Firth	Only specific tolling, such as subdivision 8(a)
Florida, Statutes 95.11(5)(h)	Two years	Not read	Not read
New Zealand, Limitation Act 2010 s15	Two years	Whether time runs from first publication or each access was argued and not decided	Late knowledge period, also read as two years; a longstop exists

A longer clock does not make a place easier to sue in: other steps before the claim, such as the New South Wales concerns notice covered below, have their own timing.

Ordinary clock in monthsUnit: months. Ordinary period only, before any court extension.

Florida24 months

New Zealand24 months

England and Wales12 months

Ireland12 months

New South Wales12 months

New York12 months

Periods from the statutes and judgment named in the table. Late-claim extensions are not included. Places not read are not shown.

The clock starts at the first upload, not the day you found the post

Ireland and New South Wales write the answer into the statute: the count starts at publication, and for online material that means the first moment people could see it. The natural instinct is to count from the day you learned of the post, and that is the wrong date.

In Ireland, section 38 of the Defamation Act 2009 says the cause of action accrues on the date of first publication, and for material published online on the date it is first capable of being viewed or listened to. In New South Wales, section 14B of the Limitation Act 1969 runs the one year from the date of publication, and defines it for electronic matter as the day the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient. Neither text counts from discovery.

The section 4A says only that the one year runs from the date on which the cause of action accrued. The page does not explain how that date is set, so the practical guide in the texts we read is section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013, which treats a later publication of the same or substantially the same statement as accruing on the date of the first publication. That points back to the first upload as well.

New York's CPLR 215(3) is silent on the start date, but the state's highest court answered the question for an online post. In Firth v State of New York, decided on July 2, 2002, a report was posted on a government website on December 16, 1996, and the claim was filed on March 18, 1998. The Court of Appeals held the one year ran from the first posting, so the claim was out of time.

In New Zealand, section 11(1) of the Limitation Act 2010 sets a six-year primary period for money claims, and section 15 reads it as two years for defamation. For a post that stays online, the Court of Appeal noted in 2019 that the parties disputed whether time runs from first publication or whether each access is a fresh publication. The court held the answer could not affect the result and did not decide it, and the Supreme Court later refused leave to appeal in 2020, so no one should plan around the more generous reading.

The working rule that follows is simple. Find the earliest date you can prove the words were visible, and count the shortest clock that could apply from that date. A discovery date matters only when a court is asked to extend.

Do reposts, edits and shares restart the clock? The single publication rules

A repost of the same words usually does not restart the clock in the places that have a written single publication rule, but a materially different new publication can. That is the pattern in England and Wales, New South Wales and New York, and it is the opposite of what many claimants assume.

Place	Rule read	What can break it	What the text leaves open
England and Wales, Defamation Act 2013 s8	A later publication of the same or substantially the same statement counts as accruing on the first publication date	Later publication materially different in manner: prominence, extent of circulation	Section 32A discretion is unaffected
New South Wales, Limitation Act 1969 s14C	Same rule for a first publisher or an associate, for the one year in s14B and the three years in s56A(2)	Same factors: prominence and extent	What counts as materially different is for a court
New York, Firth, 2002	Single publication rule applies to the internet; each viewing is not a new publication	A separate publication reaching a new audience	A claim about a link was not preserved for review
Ireland, Defamation Act 2009 s11	One cause of action for a multiple publication of the same statement	Court may allow more than one action where the interests of justice require	Different from the clock rule in s38
New Zealand, Nottingham, 2019	No ruling: the multiple publication point was argued and left undecided	Not applicable	Whole question open in the case we read

Two details in that table matter more than the headlines. A third point: Ireland's section 11 limits a claimant to one cause of action for a multiple publication, which is a different tool from the one-year clock in section 38.

The first is that the same wording does not always mean the same publication. Section 8 of the 2013 Act and section 14C of the New South Wales Act both carve out later publication that is materially different in manner, and both list prominence and extent as factors. A post moved from an obscure thread to a pinned position, or republished in a newsletter that reaches a new audience, is the kind of change those factors look at. A court may or may not treat it as new, and a defendant will argue it did not.

The second is that edits to the same page are not automatically a new publication. In Firth, the court held that adding unrelated material to the same website did not republish the earlier report, and said republication requires a separate publication reaching a new audience, not merely a delayed circulation of the original edition. That was a government site and a New York ruling. It is a signal of how one high court reasoned, not a rule for every state.

When the deadline has passed: how courts can extend it

A missed deadline can sometimes be rescued, but only by a court exercising judgment, and the court powers we read ask for reasons for the delay. None of them treats an extension as the claimant's right.

In England and Wales, section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 lets a court direct that section 4A does not apply where it would be equitable to allow the action to proceed. The court weighs the prejudice the time limit causes the claimant against the prejudice a ruling for the claimant would cause the defendant. It looks especially at the length of and reasons for the delay, when the claimant learned the facts if they came out late and whether they acted promptly and reasonably once they knew, and whether evidence is likely to be unavailable or less cogent because of the delay.

In Ireland, section 38 allows a court to give a longer period, but not more than two years from accrual. It must be satisfied that the interests of justice require the extension and that the prejudice to the claimant without it would significantly outweigh the prejudice to the defendant if it were granted. The reason the one year was missed and the effect of delay on evidence are listed factors.

In New South Wales, section 56A lets a court extend the period to up to three years from publication if it is just and reasonable to allow an action to proceed. The factors it lists follow the same pattern: the length and reasons for the delay, when late facts became known and whether the claimant acted promptly, and whether evidence is likely to be unavailable or less cogent. Under section 56D, an application can be made even after the period has expired, and under section 56C a court may reduce costs payable to a successful claimant because the late action cost the defendant more to answer.

In New Zealand, the Limitation Act 2010 has a late knowledge route with a longstop. The Court of Appeal in Nottingham v Maltese Cat noted that section 15 reads the six-year primary period in section 11(1) and the three-year late knowledge period in section 11(3)(a) as two years each for defamation. Its description of section 11 includes a 15 year longstop, though the judgment does not say expressly how section 15 affects it. It also held that a claim for a declaration is not a money claim, so the section 11 defence did not apply to that claim. That was a decision on its own facts, and we did not read the statute page itself, so do not treat it as a way around the clock.

In New York, the section we read shows no general discretionary extension. Subdivision 8(a) of CPLR 215 can extend the deadline when a criminal case against the same defendant arises from the same event. That is a narrow tolling rule, not a safety net for a missed year.

What stops the clock and what does not

The only pre-claim step that touches a clock in the texts we read is a concerns notice in New South Wales, which gives a short extension. A message to the platform, a request to a search engine or a letter to the author is not described as stopping anything.

The order in which people act often burns the year: report to the platform, wait, write to the author, wait again, then ask a lawyer. Each step is reasonable, and together they can consume most of twelve months. The platform route and the legal route can run at the same time.

New South Wales is the one place where we read a pre-claim step that touches the clock. Section 14B says that if a concerns notice, as defined in the state's Defamation Act 2005, is given in the 56 days before the period expires, the period is extended by 56 days minus the days remaining after the notice day. The text's own example is that notice given seven days before expiry yields a 50-day extension. That is a narrow extension, not a pause button, and it applies only to a notice that meets the statute's definition.

Removal routes that do not involve a lawsuit have their own rules and time limits, which we did not read for this guide. Read each route's own terms before relying on it.

One post, six clocks: an invented timeline

The scenario below is invented, with generic parties and made-up dates, to show how the same facts look on different clocks. It does not predict how any court would rule.

Assume an author uploads a false post about a consultant at the start of month 0. The post names her and says she was dismissed for fraud, which she was not. Count months from that upload.

One invented post across twelve to twenty-four months

Month 0: the uploadThe author publishes the post to a public page. This is the date every clock below is counted from.
Month 2: the consultant finds itA client mentions it. Discovery does not start anything. The clock has already been running for two months.
Month 3: she reports it and writes to the authorThe platform replies slowly and the author refuses to remove it. No clock has stopped.
Month 5: the author reposts the same wordsA second page carries identical text. In England and Wales, New South Wales and New York, the single publication rules point to the first date unless the manner of the second publication is materially different.
Month 8: the post is moved to a newsletterThe same words now reach a new audience under a prominent headline. This is the case where prominence and extent matter, and a defendant will argue it is not new.
Month 11: she first speaks to a lawyerOne month remains on a one-year clock. A claim must be filed by month 12 to be inside time in England and Wales, Ireland, New South Wales and New York.
Month 13: the one-year clocks have runOnly a court extension can save a claim in England and Wales, Ireland, New South Wales or New York. Florida and New Zealand are still inside their two years, subject to what we could not read about them.
Month 24: the two-year clocks runWithout a late knowledge or other route, a claim in Florida or New Zealand is also out of time.

The most important move was available at month 2, not month 11: the earlier a lawyer sees the facts, the more of the year there is for a notice, a letter and a claim. The repost at month 5 and the newsletter at month 8 are the two points a claimant is tempted to rely on to restart the clock. Do not rely on either. The first is the kind of repeat a single publication rule exists to ignore. The second might be treated as materially different, but a defendant will resist that, and a claim built on it has its own evidence to prove.

Five mistakes that use up the year

Most missed deadlines come from a few habits rather than a lack of merit.

Counting from discovery. Ireland and New South Wales count from first publication or upload.
Treating a platform report as a legal step. Nothing we read says it stops a limitation period.
Assuming a repost resets the count. Where a single publication rule exists, repeats of the same words fold into the first date unless materially different.
Relying on an extension. Section 32A, section 38 and section 56A are discretionary and weigh why you waited.
Losing proof of the first date. Evidence of when a post first appeared can disappear when a page is edited or deleted. Keep dated captures from the day you find it.

The places we could not read

We could not read the limitation rules for Scotland, Northern Ireland, Canada or any of its provinces, California, Texas, any US state other than New York and Florida, or any Australian state or territory other than New South Wales. For Florida we read the period but not the start date or any extension. We did not open the New Zealand Limitation Act 2010 itself, only the Court of Appeal judgment that quotes its sections.

The Limitation Act 1980 section 4A and the Defamation Act 2013 section 8 pages we read are marked as extending to England and Wales. Those rows are therefore not a statement about Scotland or Northern Ireland, which have their own rules we did not read.

We state no figure for those places, because a wrong figure in this field is worse than a blank. If your post touches one of them, treat the period as short, start the lawyer conversation now and do not assume it matches any figure in this guide. If the post was read in several countries, which clock governs is a question for counsel.

How to work out your own deadline in an afternoon

You cannot calculate a legal deadline without a lawyer, but you can prepare the facts a lawyer needs in the first hour.

Preparing for the first call with a lawyer

Find the earliest dateSearch for the earliest copy of the post and note its upload date, page address and where you found it. List every copy with its date.
Save dated capturesCapture each page showing the words, the author and any visible date before you contact anyone, because contact can lead to edits or deletion.
List the places involvedWhere you live, where the author lives, where the platform is based and where readers are. Several clocks may be candidates, and the lawyer will tell you which governs.
Count the shortest clockAdd the shortest period in the table to the first date, or one year if your place was not read. Mark that date and the date a month earlier.
Book the lawyer before the platform answersAsk about the clock in the first call. Removal steps can continue in parallel.

A lawyer will correct step four if your place has a rule we did not read. It gives the lawyer a date to check, not an answer to accept.

If the post is under a year old, act on the legal clock first

If the post is still inside its first year, the first call should be to a lawyer who handles defamation in the right place, and the rest of the work can run beside it. If it is older, a lawyer can still tell you whether an extension is realistic and whether another route fits.

If this is happening to you now

Write down the date the post first went up, save dated captures of every copy, and book a call with a defamation lawyer in your own jurisdiction this week. The removal and search steps can run in parallel, and a private audit will show you where the post sits and who else carries it. Request a private audit.

The legal clock and the search-visibility problem are separate, and a lawyer's advice does not move a post off page one. Reputation Partners works on the second problem while your counsel handles the first, and we do not give legal advice or promise any outcome. Each route has risks: a removal request can draw attention to a post, and a letter before action can lead the author to repost or to publish a second article about the dispute. A lawyer is the person to weigh those against your deadline.

Questions people ask

What if I only found the post years later?

The texts we read count from publication, not from discovery, so a late discovery does not restart the clock. It can matter to an extension: the England and Wales, Ireland and New South Wales lists of factors include when you learned the facts and whether you then acted promptly. New Zealand has a separate late knowledge period, which the court read as two years for defamation. None of this is automatic.

Can I still ask for the post to be removed after the deadline?

The statutes we read govern lawsuits, not requests to platforms, publishers or search engines. Those routes have their own rules and time limits, which we did not read for this guide. A deadline that has passed for a lawsuit does not by itself close them, but each route's own terms decide, so check them before relying on one.

Which country's clock applies if the post was read in several places?

Nothing we read answers that, and the answer can depend on where the author, the platform and the readers are. A lawyer decides. Until you have that advice, work to the shortest clock among the places connected to the post, and do not assume the longest one applies.

Why does evidence matter to the deadline?

Each extension power we read lists whether relevant evidence is likely to be unavailable or less cogent because of the delay. A court is more willing to hear a claim where records and the original post can still be tested. A claimant who waited until the page was deleted and memories had faded has a weaker case for more time.

Does a short deadline mean the claim is weak?

No. The deadline is a procedural limit, separate from the tests for defamation. A claim that would succeed on the facts can fail on time, and a claim that is on time can still fail on the merits. That is why the clock and the merits are best checked together, early, by a lawyer who knows the court you would use.